# The Road to the Second World War

History II · Contemporary History · https://tryals.app/learn/history-ii/the-road-to-the-second-world-war

## Why Nobody Stopped It

The sequence from 1931 to 1939 charts the breakdown of peace:

* **1931**: Japan invades Manchuria. The League of Nations fails to act.
* **1935**: Italy attacks Ethiopia. Weak sanctions fail.
* **March 1936**: German troops enter the Rhineland, breaking Versailles and Locarno. France demurs.
* **1936–39**: The Spanish Civil War. German and Italian forces back Franco, while Soviet aid supports the Republic.
* **March 1938**: Anschluss unites Germany with Austria.
* **September 1938**: The **Munich** agreement cedes the Sudetenland.
* **March 1939**: German forces seize Bohemia and Moravia.
* **23 August 1939**: The **Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact** splits eastern Europe between Berlin and Moscow.
* **1 September 1939**: Germany invades Poland, triggering war.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union suffered internal trauma. Collectivisation triggered the **Holodomor** famine in Ukraine. Later, the **Great Terror** (1937–38) purged the Red Army, convincing Western powers that Soviet military strength was compromised.

## Debating Appeasement

Debates over **appeasement** developed across three main stages. Early critics called it simple cowardice. In 1961, **A. J. P. Taylor** argued that Hitler was merely an opportunist following traditional German foreign policy.

| Interpretation of appeasement | Core claim |
|---|---|
| *Guilty Men* orthodoxy | Failure of nerve and judgement by identifiable politicians |
| Taylor (1961) | Hitler was an opportunist; the war emerged from miscalculation |
| Constraint-based revision | Rearmament, empire, allies and opinion left few real options |
| Counter-revision | The constraints were real, and 1936 and 1938 were still choices |

Later revisionists highlighted British domestic constraints. The Treasury feared economic ruin from premature spending. The Dominions hesitated, public anti-war sentiment ran deep, and global threats from Japan and Italy loomed.

> **Common pitfall:** treating appeasement as either sheer cowardice or unavoidable destiny. Good history weighs the genuine constraints of 1936, 1938, and 1939 against the alternatives then available.

## Practice questions

8 of this lesson's 15 practice questions, with answers. The full set is in the app.

### 1. Germany occupied the remainder of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939, six months after Munich. Why is that step usually treated as the moment British policy changed?

A. It marked the first unilateral breach of a post-First World War treaty by Germany
B. It seized non-German-speaking land, disproving claims that demands were national
C. It led the League of Nations to impose its first binding universal economic sanctions
D. It coincided with Germany explicitly repudiating bilateral naval limits with Britain

**Answer:** B. It seized non-German-speaking land, disproving claims that demands were national

**Why:** Munich was defensible to its supporters as the last application of national self-determination, the Sudetenland was German-speaking. Taking Prague could not be described that way, which removed the framework within which further concessions could be justified. The guarantee to Poland followed within a fortnight.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/history-ii/the-road-to-the-second-world-war/germany-occupied-the-remainder-of-bohemia-and-moravia-in-march-1939

### 2. Arrange these acts of aggression and diplomacy in order.

**Answer:**

1. Japan seizes Manchuria
2. Italy invades Ethiopia
3. Germany remilitarises the Rhineland
4. Germany annexes Austria
5. The Munich agreement transfers the Sudetenland
6. Germany occupies Bohemia and Moravia
7. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact is signed

**Why:** The acceleration is the striking feature: four years between the first two, then five major steps in three and a half years. Each unpunished action lowered the expected cost of the next, which is the mechanism critics of appeasement point at and the one its defenders have to answer.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/history-ii/the-road-to-the-second-world-war/arrange-these-acts-of-aggression-and-diplomacy-in-order

### 3. Historians debate whether British policy was shaped primarily by severe structural constraints or by the political choices of individual leaders. What follows from adopting a counter-revisionist approach to appeasement?

A. Domestic public opinion alone dictated British diplomatic choices
B. Ministers retained agency despite the genuine systemic limits
C. Hitler's opportunism rendered British policy decisions irrelevant
D. Structural limitations made diplomatic compromise entirely unavoidable

**Answer:** B. Ministers retained agency despite the genuine systemic limits

**Why:** Treating appeasement as an inevitable outcome of economic and imperial limits overlooks the deliberate political decisions taken at Rhineland and Munich. Counter-revisionism insists structural pressures bounded policy without entirely eliminating ministerial agency.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/history-ii/the-road-to-the-second-world-war/historians-debate-whether-british-policy-was-shaped-primarily-by

### 4. Which constraints do historians cite when explaining British policy in the later 1930s?

A. Japan and Italy posed simultaneous threats in other theatres
B. Rearmament was incomplete and the Treasury feared losing a long war through overspending
C. Britain was legally forbidden by the League Covenant to rearm
D. The Dominions were unwilling to support a European war

**Answer:** A. Japan and Italy posed simultaneous threats in other theatres; B. Rearmament was incomplete and the Treasury feared losing a long war through overspending; D. The Dominions were unwilling to support a European war

**Why:** The constraint-based account does not claim Munich was right; it claims the alternatives in 1938 were worse than the retrospective view assumes. The counter-argument is that constraints and choices coexist: Britain and France were far stronger relative to Germany in 1936, when the Rhineland was remilitarised and nothing was done.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/history-ii/the-road-to-the-second-world-war/which-constraints-do-historians-cite-when-explaining-british-policy

### 5. Arrange the steps by which each unpunished action lowered the cost of the next.

**Answer:**

1. Japan takes Manchuria and the League condemns without acting
2. Italy invades Ethiopia and sanctions exclude oil
3. Germany remilitarises the Rhineland and France does not respond
4. Austria is annexed without opposition
5. The Sudetenland is transferred by agreement at Munich

**Why:** The final step is qualitatively different and that is the point. Manchuria, Ethiopia and the Rhineland were met with inaction; Munich was met with signature. Moving from failing to prevent something to agreeing to it is a change in kind, and it is the change that made the guarantee to Poland necessary six months later.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/history-ii/the-road-to-the-second-world-war/arrange-the-steps-by-which-each-unpunished-action-lowered-the-cost-of

### 6. In which year was the Munich agreement signed, transferring the Sudetenland to Germany?

**Answer:** 1938

**Why:** **1938**, in September, six months after the Anschluss and six before the occupation of Prague. The compression matters: the agreement that was presented as a settlement was overtaken within half a year, which is why it became the standard example of a concession that purchased nothing.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/history-ii/the-road-to-the-second-world-war/in-which-year-was-the-munich-agreement-signed-transferring-the

### 7. Sort each statement by whether it describes the SOVIET UNION in the 1930s or the WESTERN POWERS.

**Answer:**

- The Soviet Union: Collectivisation produced a famine with millions of deaths, A non-aggression pact was signed with Germany in August 1939
- The western powers: Rearmament was constrained by fears about long-run finances, Dominion governments were unwilling to back a European war

**Why:** The two columns explain each other. The Terror made western governments doubt Soviet military capacity, which weakened the case for an alliance; western hesitation over Czechoslovakia made Stalin doubt western resolve. Each side’s reading of the other pushed both towards the arrangement of August 1939.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/history-ii/the-road-to-the-second-world-war/sort-each-statement-by-whether-it-describes-the-soviet-union-in-the

### 8. Historians distinguish between explaining a decision and justifying it. How does that distinction apply to Munich?

A. Showing severe diplomatic and domestic constraints proves Chamberlain took the only viable course
B. It proves British policymakers fabricated strategic and imperial pressures later to defend the policy
C. It suggests historians must judge the Munich agreement purely on ethics rather than 1938 practicalities
D. Identifying military, imperial and political constraints explains the choice without justifying it

**Answer:** D. Identifying military, imperial and political constraints explains the choice without justifying it

**Why:** The distinction keeps two questions apart. Constraints explain why the option was attractive; whether it was the best available requires comparing it with alternatives, including the far stronger position of 1936. Collapsing the two produces either a caricature of cowardice or an argument that whatever happened was necessary.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/history-ii/the-road-to-the-second-world-war/historians-distinguish-between-explaining-a-decision-and-justifying