# Institutions and the Distribution of Power

Political Science I · Political Science I · https://tryals.app/learn/political-science-i/institutions-and-the-distribution-of-power

## Who Can Dismiss Whom

Systems of government hinge on one question: **does the executive depend on the confidence of the legislature?**

| System | Head of government | Executive survival | Executive origin |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Parliamentary** | PM, from assembly | Legislative confidence | The legislature |
| **Presidential** | President, directly elected | Fixed term | Direct election |
| **Semi-presidential** | PM and president | Mixed | Mixed |

**Parliamentary** systems fuse the executive and legislature. The government falls when it loses legislative confidence.

**Presidential** systems separate the branches. Neither can remove the other easily. **Juan Linz** highlights two major perils of **Presidentialism**:
- **dual legitimacy**: both president and assembly claim a mandate.
- **rigidity**: a failed president cannot be removed before their term ends.

**Semi-presidential** regimes feature an elected president alongside a prime minister. **Cohabitation** occurs when the president and the parliamentary majority belong to opposing parties.

Whether a state is a **Monarchy** or a **republic** depends on its head of state. This status is largely separate from its degree of democracy.

### Territorial Distribution of Power

| Form | Sovereignty | Example |
|---|---|---|
| **Unitary** | Held centrally | Portugal |
| **Regionalised** | Substantial devolved powers | Italy |
| **Federal** | Divided between levels | Germany |
| **Confederal** | Held by member states | The EU (partially) |

A system is federal only if regional powers are **constitutionally entrenched**. The centre cannot unilaterally revoke them.

**Spain** is a complex case under its **1978** **Constitution**. It establishes **17** autonomous communities without using the word federal. Competences rely on **Articles** **148** and **149** alongside each **Statute** of **Autonomy**. Asymmetries like the special charters in the **Basque Country** and **Navarre** fuel ongoing debate in **Spanish** constitutional law.

### Other Institutions

A legislative body like a **Parliament** balances scrutinising, representing, and legislating. **Independent institutions** trade democratic accountability for credibility.

> **Common pitfall:** assuming a country with a president uses a presidential system. Germany, Italy, and Portugal have presidents but are parliamentary systems.

## Practice questions

9 of this lesson's 14 practice questions, with answers. The full set is in the app.

### 1. Ireland, Germany, Italy and Portugal all have presidents. Why are none of them presidential systems?

A. Their heads of state are chosen indirectly by parliamentary assemblies
B. In each, the executive depends on the confidence of the legislature
C. None of these states feature an entrenched constitutional separation of powers
D. A presidential system requires a fully unitary territorial division of power

**Answer:** B. In each, the executive depends on the confidence of the legislature

**Why:** Because the classification turns on **who can dismiss whom**, not on what the head of state is called. In all four the government falls if the assembly withdraws confidence, which makes them parliamentary regardless of the presidency. Note that direct election does not settle it either: Ireland and Portugal elect their presidents directly.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/political-science-i/institutions-and-the-distribution-of-power/ireland-germany-italy-and-portugal-all-have-presidents-why-are

### 2. Sort each feature by the system of government it belongs to.

**Answer:**

- Parliamentary: Fall on no-confidence, Exec from legislature
- Presidential: Fixed term, no dismissal, Dual branch legitimacy
- Semi-presidential: Elected pres, assembly PM, Cohabitation of rivals

**Why:** Dual legitimacy and cohabitation are the two features worth understanding rather than memorising. Both arise when two institutions hold independent mandates; the difference is that a semi-presidential constitution has a mechanism for the resulting conflict, and a presidential one, on Linz's argument, does not.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/political-science-i/institutions-and-the-distribution-of-power/sort-each-feature-by-the-system-of-government-it-belongs-to

### 3. Which are true of Linz's critique of presidentialism?

A. Presidential systems have never sustained a stable democracy
B. His empirical claim about breakdown rates is disputed on grounds of confounding
C. Dual legitimacy leaves no constitutional way to resolve a clash of mandates
D. Fixed terms mean a failed president cannot be replaced early

**Answer:** B. His empirical claim about breakdown rates is disputed on grounds of confounding; C. Dual legitimacy leaves no constitutional way to resolve a clash of mandates; D. Fixed terms mean a failed president cannot be replaced early

**Why:** The fourth is refuted immediately. The serious version of the critique is about **risk** rather than impossibility, and the serious response is that presidentialism is concentrated in regions with other risk factors, so the correlation with breakdown may not be causal. Both halves belong in an accurate summary.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/political-science-i/institutions-and-the-distribution-of-power/which-are-true-of-linzs-critique-of-presidentialism

### 4. Complete the account of institutions.

**Answer:** A system in which the executive depends on the confidence of the legislature is **parliamentary**. Linz's two objections to presidentialism are rigidity and **dual** legitimacy. A semi-presidential system in which president and parliamentary majority come from opposing camps is in **cohabitation**. The test for federalism is whether the division of powers is constitutionally **entrenched**.

**Why:** The last blank is the one that settles hard cases. Asking how much power a region has produces endless argument; asking whether the centre could take it back by ordinary legislation usually produces an answer.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/political-science-i/institutions-and-the-distribution-of-power/complete-the-account-of-institutions

### 5. In a semi-presidential regime, the president and the prime minister can come from opposing parties, producing cohabitation. What underlying institutional feature makes this possible, and what does it expose about the distribution of authority?

A. The judiciary holds final authority to appoint executive posts
B. The legislature alone retains the power to dismiss both leaders
C. A split executive origin produces competing bases of authority
D. A single unified mandate is shared between both rival leaders

**Answer:** C. A split executive origin produces competing bases of authority

**Why:** Cohabitation arises because the president and the assembly are elected independently, generating distinct sources of legitimacy. It shows that dual executives can fragment executive power when opposing coalitions control the presidency and the legislative majority.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/political-science-i/institutions-and-the-distribution-of-power/in-a-semi-presidential-regime-the-president-and-the-prime-minister

### 6. How many autonomous communities did the 1978 Spanish Constitution ultimately produce?

**Answer:** 17 (within ±1.5)

**Why:** **Seventeen**, plus the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla. The Constitution did not create them directly: it set out a route by which territories could claim autonomy, and the map that resulted was built over the following years, which is part of why the competences are asymmetric.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/political-science-i/institutions-and-the-distribution-of-power/how-many-autonomous-communities-did-the-1978-spanish-constitution

### 7. Arrange these territorial arrangements from the most centralised to the most decentralised.

**Answer:**

1. Unitary state with administrative deconcentration only
2. Unitary state with devolved administrative powers
3. Regionalised state with legislative competences
4. Federal state with constitutionally entrenched division
5. Confederation of sovereign member states

**Why:** The ordering is a useful map with one caveat: the steps are not equally spaced and real cases sit between them. Spain is the standing example of a case that sits between the third and fourth positions and is argued about for exactly that reason.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/political-science-i/institutions-and-the-distribution-of-power/arrange-these-territorial-arrangements-from-the-most-centralised-to

### 8. Match each institution to the trade-off it embodies.

**Answer:**

- Independent central bank → Credibility bought at the cost of accountability
- Constitutional court → Rights protected at the cost of majority decision
- Fixed presidential term → Stability bought at the cost of removing a failed executive
- Confidence relation in parliamentary systems → Flexibility bought at the cost of governmental instability

**Why:** Framing institutions as trade-offs rather than as good or bad designs is the habit worth taking from this unit. Every one of these arrangements is a deliberate choice to make something harder, and the argument about each is really an argument about which risk a society would rather run.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/political-science-i/institutions-and-the-distribution-of-power/match-each-institution-to-the-trade-off-it-embodies

### 9. Whether a country is a monarchy or a republic tells you little about how democratic it is.

**Answer:** True

**Why:** **True.** Spain, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Japan are parliamentary monarchies whose monarchs hold essentially no political power, while a great many republics are not democratic at all. Head of state and system of government are separate axes, and conflating them produces confident nonsense.

Page: https://tryals.app/practice/political-science-i/institutions-and-the-distribution-of-power/whether-a-country-is-a-monarchy-or-a-republic-tells-you-little-about