The End of Cheap Energy
The oil shock of 1973 ended the Golden Age. When OPEC embargoed oil during the Yom Kippur War, the price quadrupled from roughly 3 to 12 dollars per barrel. A second shock in 1979 (Iranian Revolution) pushed it above 35. The era of cheap energy was over — and with it, the postwar bargain.
Stagflation — simultaneous stagnation and inflation — was the monster the Keynesian toolkit was not built for:
- Supply-side shock: oil is an input to almost everything. A price spike raises costs across the economy (cost-push inflation) while reducing output (the real economy contracts). The result: prices up, output down — both at once.
- The Phillips curve broke: the postwar consensus assumed a stable trade-off between inflation and unemployment — stimulate to reduce unemployment, accept higher inflation, and vice versa. Stagflation showed that both could rise together when the shock came from supply, not demand.
Policy response (eventually): the Keynesian demand-management approach lost credibility. Paul Volcker at the Fed (1979) chose to crush inflation with extreme monetary tightening — raising interest rates above 20%. The result: a severe recession (1981-82), but inflation fell from 13% to 3%. The pain bought credibility, and inflation expectations anchored.
The broader policy rethink of the 1980s: deregulation, privatisation, supply-side economics (Thatcher in the UK, Reagan in the US), independent central banks focused on price stability, and a shift from fiscal to monetary policy as the primary macro tool. The mixed economy retreated; market-oriented policies advanced.
The structural legacy: energy intensity — the amount of energy per unit of GDP — began a long decline. Economies diversified away from oil-intensive industry; fuel efficiency improved; service sectors grew. The oil shocks forced an adaptation that permanently changed the relationship between energy and growth.
Two policy eras
| Keynesian consensus | Post-1979 | |
|---|---|---|
| Diagnosis | Demand management | Inflation is monetary |
| Tool | Fiscal fine-tuning | High rates, credibility |
| Casualty | Broke on stagflation | Deep 1980-82 recession |
Tip: Stagflation's lesson in one line: demand tools cannot fix a supply shock. Stimulating demand into an oil shortage buys more inflation, not more output — the diagnosis must precede the medicine.