Sorting the Types First
Before linking conduct to a result, classify the offence.
| Classification | The two poles | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| By result | Mere-activity vs result offences | Only result offences raise causation |
| By subject | Common vs special offences | Special offences require a defined status |
| By the harm | Injury vs danger offences | Danger offences punish before harm occurs |
Offences of danger split further:
- A concrete-danger offence requires proof that a specific person or object was endangered.
- An abstract-danger offence punishes conduct that is typically dangerous, without proof of actual danger in the case.
Offences of one's own hand require the defendant to physically perform the act personally.
Causation
For result offences, the baseline is the theory of the equivalence of conditions. Every necessary condition is a cause, and all causes are equal. It uses the conditio sine qua non test: mentally remove the conduct and see if the result still occurs.
This test casts too wide a net. Two internal corrections emerged:
- The theory of adequate causation counts only conditions that generally tend to produce that result.
- The theory of relevance distinguishes natural causation from causal relevance under the specific offence.
Objective Imputation
Modern doctrine separates factual cause from legal responsibility. Objective imputation is a normative assessment with three stages:
- The conduct must create a legally disapproved risk.
- That risk must have materialised in the result.
- The result must fall within the protective scope of the infringed norm.
Key applications include:
- Risk reduction: lessening a greater harm creates no disapproved risk.
- Permitted risk: socially tolerated danger, such as normal driving, is not disapproved.
- Self-endangerment: if the victim freely assumes the risk, the result is not imputed to another.
- Atypical causal courses: unexpected intervening events break the connection to the initial risk.
Common pitfall: answering "did the conduct cause the result?" and stopping. Causation is necessary, but it is never sufficient.